work to clarify the law. As to the first point, as discussed previously 5 and below (see Figs. 1A & 1B) , Mayo and Alice have been followed by the elevated prevalence of PSM rejections (overall and pre-abandonment) and PSM ex parte decisions among software and medical diagnostics applications. 6 Office actions including a 101 subject matter rejection rose from 25% pre-Alice, to a steady state of 75% as of the last USPTO release (in 2017) among software applications and 7% pre-Mayo to about 50% among medical diagnostic applications (Fig. 1A) , though only to 15% among all applications. The rate of ex parte decisions addressing 101 has also shot up, from less than 10% to over 80% in 2018 in medical diagnostic and software technology areas, and to 26% overall. 7 If the aim is to restore certainty to pre-Alice and Mayo levels, then one would expect to see these rates decline with effective interventions. The USPTO has previously made data available to track office action metrics, but the last update was in 2017. As in the first post, I urge the USPTO to release updated data so that the impact of any policy intervention -new guidelines, new decisions, or 101 deferral -can be gauged using these metrics.
The second idea, a complementary approach to 101 guidance, builds on the idea of deferring 101 subject matter until other rejections are dealt with. Though 101 usually comes first, the new guidelines explicitly state that there is no "mandate that the patentability requirements be analyzed in any particular order." 8 My proposal builds on the initial suggestion of Professors Robert Merges and Dennis Crouch 9 that 101 be considered only when "absolutely necessary" 10 but with some important modifications. I propose that deferral be applicant's option, not mandatory, and the USPTO should, as it has done previously, 11 initially roll out the policy as a pilot pilot with 5 Chien (Oct. 2018) supra note 1. 6 See Chien and Wu, supra note 1, for definitions. 7 Based on a text search of decisions posted to the USPTO PTAB database including "101 and (bilski or benson or alice or mayo or diehr or nuijten or ariosa or enfish or smartgene)," accuracy of which, based on manual inspection of 142 cases, correctly identified 138 of them. Excludes IPR/CBM, Interference cases. in which the USPTO randomly chose 500 trademark registrants to participate in a pilot that required the selected owners to submit proof of use. The test was used to seed a roundtable discussion that supported establishment of a permanent program similar to the pilot, which in turn was used to support a final rule. randomization, to ensure that deferral is having the desired impact of reducing uncertainty according, e.g. to the metrics outlined above.
Experimenting with Ordering
The case for deferring 101 builds on the insight that rarely is patentable subject matter the single dispositive issue. 12 As shown below in Fig. 2 , the share of office actions just prior to abandonment that only raise 101 issues is less than 2%. Even among business method (TC36BM) and medical diagnostic applications, the share is less than 15%. (Fig. 2) At the same time, 101 has become highly controversial -from rarely being appealed, 101 subject matter rejections are now increasingly the subject of ex parte appeal decsions. 13 (Fig.  1B ) Deciding non-101 grounds first could avoid difficult subject matter discussions. The USPTO's new guidelines implement this logic to a degree, shifting focus towards 112 and away from 101.
The idea of deferral is precedented. As Crouch and Merges point out, the Supreme Court doctrine of avoidance allows the Court to "resolve[] cases on non-constitutional grounds whenever possible," 14 to conserve court resources and legitimacy. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program, in effect, was put in place during the Obama Administration to delay the deportation of young undocumented immigrants while awaiting Congressional immigration reform. 15 Other federal agencies have also used deferral, for example, in the mid to late 2000s, when the application of immigration law to same-sex couples in some cases risked the undesirable outcome of family separation. 16 To avoid this harsh consequence, Department of Homeland Security prosecutors administratively closed some cases, immigration judges granted continuances for unusually long periods, and US Customs and Immigration enforcement officials granted requests for deferred action. 17 That is to say, they avoided the law by deferring its application.
12 Though 101 may tip the balance in cases where other rejections are pending. 13 Even though 101 patentable subject matter issues appear in a quarter of 2018 appeals decisions, this share is still dwarfed compared to the share of decisions that mention, for example, "102" (, "103", or "112" issues though note that these numbers are inflated because they do not include case specific limitations that can weed out false positives based on incidental mentions (such as " 10/282102") 14 Crouch & Merges, supra note 9, at 1681-82. 15 Described in Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 Duke L. J. 1173 , 1180 (2016 . 16 Described Id., at 1202-1204. 17 Id. (also describing similar approaches for preventing the separation of military families and effecting gender asylum).
The USPTO could create a way for applicants to signal their desire to defer and hopefully avoid PSM issues, on the theory that cases could in many cases resolve, through allowance or abandonment, through resolution of less controversial, non-101 grounds. 18 But because 101 deferral could also be counterproductive, prolonging prosecution and withholding information that the applicant would have otherwise relied upon, I propose making 101 deferral optional, at applicant's discretion. This would preserve the benefits of compact prosecution and the freedom of prosecutors to select a slow or fast track for each application. Although some may worry that applicants will game play and deliberately delay with this option, it's unclear that 101-deferral would provide substantially greater opportunities to delay than existing continuation practice.
The Advantages of Experimentation
Trying out applicant-initiated 101 deferral through a rigorous pilot has several advantages. First, unlike changing the law or its application which requires all to adjust, only applicants dissatisfied with the status quo would see a change. Applicants that don't have a problem with 101, which could well be the vast majority of them -85% of office actions don't even include a PSM rejection, I've reported previously 19 -and those that examine their applications wouldn't need to alter their ways.
Second, implementing 101 deferral as a pilot with randomization, like the USPTO did when it conducted the post-trademark registration proof-of-use pilot, will support effective policy-making through evaluation, iteration, and refinement. In that pilot, the USPTO randomly selected 500 registrations to participate in the initial program to assess the accuracy and integrity of the trademark register. 20 Though companies selected to participate in the pilot had to comply with additional regulatory requirements, randomization ensured that the pilot's findings were representative and its burdens, fairly distributed. 21 The results of the test and related USPTO reports, outreach and 18 For example, if an invention is incurably anticipated, obvious or unsupported, the case will have been resolved without considering subject matter. Likewise, if the claims have been reformulated responsive to non-101 rejections and mooted any subject matter defects in the process, PSM will not factor into the application's outcome. 19 Chien (Oct. 2018), supra note 1. 20 Described in 77 FR 30197, supra note 11. 21 77 FR 30197, 30198 supra note 11 (explaining that randomness in the pilot was necessary to "ensure that the resulting assessment is not skewed by consideration of registrations with deliberations were used to expand and make the program permanent. 22 A 101 deferral pilot could take a similar route. I explore design (intent-to-treat), ethical (through consent) and methodological (power, randomization, etc.) concerns and details below.
Finally, my proposal preserves the benefits of the status quo, including the little-discussed incentive prosecutors now have to add details to their patent applications and claims, a good thing. In work with students 23 that I presented at the Federal Trade Commission's recent hearings, building on an earlier analysis in IP Watchdog 24 by Will Gvoth, Rocky Bernsden, and Peter Glaser from Harrity & Harrity LLP, we observed that there has been a "flight to quality" among patent complaints and applications. Applying a differences-indifferences approach, we observed that specification length and counts of words and unique words in first claims have grown among software applications relative to others following Alice. (Figure 3A -C) Deferring 101 would preserve this previously unexplored, largely positive aspect of the "Mayo-Alice effect" on software patent drafting. If 101 were eviscerated by Congress, so too could the incentive to be more concrete in describing and claiming inventions.
Implementing 101 Deferral through a Randomized Control Trial
Due to their rise in the wake of Mayo and Alice, 101 shares among appeals and last office actions pre-abandonment, as explored previously and below) present strong candidates for evaluation. From the baseline, then, we would expect to see declines in the proportion of 101 in appeals and office actions, and possibly a shorter pendency, among treated (101-deferred) as compared to control (101-not deferred) cases. particular criteria, and that implementation of the rules does not create an unfair burden on specific types of trademark owners"). The USPTO could begin a pilot by offering applications in high impact art units that have a PSM rejection on the first office action a chance to defer. 25 Using an intent-to-treat design, the agency could then randomly grant deferral to half of participants, 26 using a process like rolling a die, picking out of a hat, or some other non-game-able criteria. All who wanted to defer 101 would participate, but by giving half of the group the right to do so and denying it to the other, the outcomes of otherwise identical groups could be compared.
The idea of offering deferral to some but not all applicants may seem unfair. But by their nature, policy pilots, for example the first action interview pilot program, which was initially available only to certain art units, 27 test out a policy on some and withhold it from others. In addition, the opt-in process should make clear that participants will receive a chance, not guarantee of deferral, minimizing any risk of unwanted surprise. Because the proposal implements 101 deferral as optional, not mandatory, an opt-in would not compromise external validity (the extent to which findings can be generalized beyond the test group).
To ensure that the results of a pilot yield statistically precise results requires sufficient "power" -that is, a large enough group of applications to detect differences in the treated group and control group, which ideally would be at least as large as the treated group. The minimum number of applications in which 101 was deferred would depend on the size and nature of the impact of the pilot program. There is always random variation between applications that can make it difficult to tell how effective an experimental treatment actually is. The larger the expected effect of any policy, the easier it is to find that effect, and so fewer cases are required. For example, to reliably detect a difference in proportions of 20 percentage points, for example from a 80% last office action pre-abandonment rate of 101 rejections to a 60% rate would require only about 200 applications receiving deferral, 28 whereas to reliably detect a difference of 10 percentage points, for example, from a 25% PSM appeals rate to a 15% rate would require closer to 600-700 101-deferred cases. 29 Either way, rates of 101 rejections and appeals would be compared between the control and deferral groups using a chi-squared test. To detect statistically relevant differences in resolution time (as opposed to a difference in proportions), would require some estimation of the magnitude of the anticipated change, e.g. whether it was expected to be small, medium, or large. To detect a difference of as little as 4 months (on the basis of a 36-month current time to resolution estimate) would require about 1100 treated cases. Time to dispensation would be compared between the control and 101-deferred groups using a t-test.
Whatever the target number of total applications in the pilot, more applications will be required to compensate for imperfect compliance and attrition (e.g. someone dropping out early). As of early 2017, the USPTO sent approximately 300 MedDx and 2500 software and business ("36BM") office actions per month, 30 some subset of which were first office actions. At an estimated prevalence of 101 rejections of 30%-40%, 31 a trial would involve applications filed over multiple months. Expanding the pilot to include other technology centers would result in more applications over the same period of time, but the expected difference in outcome metrics might be smaller, in turn requiring a larger sample size.
Conclusion
If successful, the treatment would result in the diminished presence of 101 subject matter issues within ex parte appeals and rejections and, potentially, resolution time, e.g. closer to pre-Mayo or Alice levels. However, applicant and 28 Based on a power analysis in SAS 9.4 conducted to determine how many cases would be needed to detect differences of 3% to 30% at an alpha level of 0.05, resulting in a respective range of 84 to 7526 cases with 80% power. The code for replication is provided at https://sites.google.com/view/colleenchien/about 29 Id. 30 Author's analysis -see "101 subject matter rejection analysis," Detail 16-2017-01 sheet. Further, if the treatment applied only to "first office actions," more time would be needed to achieve sufficient power. 31 Author's analysis.
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prosecutor satisfaction with the process, changes made to what gets filed, timelines, and such factors would also be worth tracking. The conservation of USPTO resources and political capital, though harder to measure, also comprise desired outcomes.
How might such a test dovetail with other inventions, like updates to examiner guidance? Starting a trial to test "101 deferral" at a slightly different time than the guideline update would be consistent with standard experimental design. If the USPTO were to implement add 101-deferral onto another policy it was rolling out (e.g. guidance) , it could efficiently do so by specifying four groups: a pure control ("untreated") group, one that received just the guidance, one that received just "101 deferral," and one that received both treatments. 32 Assuming that examiners are trained in 101 guidance sequentially, it's likely that all four cohorts would exist naturally anyway. Known as "factorial design," this approach to experiments is used routinely when multiple interventions are being tested.
It should be noted that while deferring subject matter considerations would require be new for the USPTO, the practice is old. By bifurcating search and examination, the European Patent Office and the majority of the world, in effect vet novelty and nonobviousness issues first, and defer subject matter and other questions to the second phase of examination. 33 Why not give it a try here too? Your reactions and suggestions are welcome here 34 and will be shared with policymakers. 32 Using a factorial experimental design, described e.g. 
Figures:
*Based on text search of decisions including "101 and (bilski or benson or alice or mayo or diehr or nuijten or ariosa or enfish or smartgene)," accuracy of which, based on manual inspection of 142 cases, correctly identified 138 of them. Excludes IPR/CBM, Interference cases.
